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Abstract. This paper is the continuation of [5] and deals with further applica-
tions of coherent risk measures to problems of finance.
First, we study the optimization problem. Three forms of this problem are
considered.
Furthermore, the results obtained are applied to the optimality pricing. Again
three forms of this technique are considered.
Finally, we study the equilibrium problem both in the unconstrained and in
the constrained forms. We establish the equivalence between the global and the
competitive optima and give a dual description of the equilibrium. Moreover, we
provide an explicit geometric solution of the constrained equilibrium problem.
Most of the results are presented on two levels: on a general level the results
have a probabilistic form; for a static model with a finite number of assets, the
results have a geometric form.
Key words and phrases. Coherent risk measures, equilibrium, extreme mea-
sures, generating set, liquidity, No Better Choice, optimality pricing, optimization.
1 Introduction
1. Goal of the paper. In this paper, we consider applications of coherent risk mea-
sures to
• optimization;
• optimality pricing;
• equilibrium.
The optimization problem is considered in three forms. First we study what we call the
agent-independent optimization. It is in fact the Markowitz-type optimization problem
with variance replaced by a coherent risk measure,1 i.e. a problem of the form{
EX −→ max,
ρ(X) ≤ c,
(1.1)
1It has been clear from the outset that variance is not a very good measure of risk because high
profits are penalized in the same way as high losses. In [15], Markowitz proposed a way to over-
come this problem by considering semivariance ‖(X − EX)−‖L2 instead of variance. The function
ρ(X) = −EX + α‖(X − EX)−‖L2 with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is, in fact, an example of a coherent risk measure
(see [9]). Thus, in essence, semivariance is a particular case of the coherent risk.
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where X means the discounted P&L earned by a portfolio and ρ is a coherent risk mea-
sure (P&L means the Profit&Loss, i.e. the difference between the terminal wealth and
the initial wealth). Let us remark that this problem was considered in [1], [19], [20].2 As
opposed to these papers, we have at our disposal the notion of a generator introduced
in [5]. In terms of generators, we are able to give a geometric solution of (1.1) (see Fig-
ures 1, 2). The model we are considering takes into account such market imperfections as
cone portfolio constraints, transaction costs, and the ambiguity of the historic probability
measure.
Problem (1.1) is the optimization problem for an investor whose capital evolves in a
risk-free way. However, an investor might have a risky endowment with a random terminal
wealth W (W might have a financial or a non-financial structure; for example, it might
be the terminal wealth of a firm producing some goods). The investor trying to minimize
his/her risk by trading in the market faces the problem
ρ(X +W ) −→ min . (1.2)
Note that this coincides with the superreplication problem for the NGD pricing (see [5;
Subsect. 3.6]). We study (1.2) in two forms, which we call the global and the local single-
agent optimization, respectively. On the financial side, the former pertains to a “small”
investor, while the latter pertains to a “big” investor. For both of them, we provide a
geometric solution (see Figures 4, 6). Also, in [6; Sect. 5], we provide sufficient conditions
for the uniqueness of a solution of various optimization problems.
After considering the optimization problem, we return to the pricing problem and
apply the obtained results to the optimality pricing of contingent claims (in the finance
literature, this is typically referred to as reservation pricing). Again, we propose three
forms of this technique. They differ by the inputs they require and the assumptions
behind them (thus, of course, they produce different outputs).
The first technique, which we call the agent-independent optimality pricing, might
be considered as the limit case of the RAROC-based NGD pricing technique introduced
in [5]. A rather surprising outcome of this technique is that it provides (typically) a single
fair price of a contingent claim for all agents (under the strong assumption that all the
agents are using the same historic measure P and the same risk measure ρ and all the
agents are trying to maximize RAROC defined through P and ρ).
Another technique is called the single-agent optimality pricing. It is, in fact, the coher-
ent version of the classical utility-indifference pricing with the expected utility replaced
by the coherent one. As an outcome, this technique typically provides a single number,
which means the price of a contingent claim that is fair for a particular agent (it depends
on the risk measure he/she is using and on his/her endowment).
Then we consider one more technique called the multi-agent optimality pricing. The
idea is as follows. We have a contingent claim and several agents, each employing his/her
own coherent risk measure. A price is said to be fair if it provides no trading opportunity,
which would allow each agent to decrease his/her risk (this is a modified form of the idea
proposed in [4]). As an outcome, this technique typically provides a whole interval of
prices, which are fair for this group of agents (in fact, this interval is the convex hull of
fair prices for these agents produced by the previous technique).
Finally, we turn to the equilibrium problem. One of the basic results of the classi-
cal economic theory is the equivalence between the Pareto optimum (known also as the
“Soviet-type optimum”) and the competitive optimum (known also as the “western-type
2If ρ is defined by a finite number of probabilistic scenarios, then the corresponding optimization
problem becomes the one considered in the generalized Neyman–Pearson lemma (see [14; Ch. 3]).
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optimum”); see [13]. This result is established within the framework of the expected
utility.
In the present paper, we establish the analog of this result within the coherent util-
ity framework. This is done for two types of equilibrium: for the unconstrained one
(Theorem 4.7) and for the constrained one (Theorem 4.13). A very important feature
of coherent utility (which is not shared by the expected utility) is that it admits a rich
duality theory. Thus, we not only establish the equivalence between different types of
equilibrium, but also provide its dual description.
Moreover, for the constrained equilibrium problem, we are able to provide an explicit
geometric solution based on generators (see Figure 11). It yields the equilibrium price as
well as the equilibrium portfolios of the agents.
2. Structure of the paper. Section 2 deals with the optimization problem. In
Subsections 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4, we consider the three techniques described above. In Sub-
section 2.2, the obtained results are applied to the problem of finding the optimal struc-
ture of a firm consisting of several units. The provided theorem states that a structure
is optimal if and only if the RAROC contributions of different units are the same. In
Subsection 2.5, we apply the obtained results to the study of the liquidity effects in the
framework of the NGD pricing considered in [5].
Section 3 is related to the optimality pricing. Subsections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 correspond
to the three techniques described above.
Section 4 deals with equilibrium. Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 are, in fact, duals of each
other: they consider the unconstrained and the constrained equilibria, respectively.
Altogether, there are seven pricing techniques proposed in [5] and in the present paper.
They are compared in the final Section 5.
2 Optimization
2.1 Agent-Independent Optimization
We consider the model of [5; Subsect. 3.2]. Thus, we are given a probability space
(Ω,F ,P), a convex weakly compact set RD ⊂ P , an L1 -closed convex set PD ⊂ RD ,
and a convex set A ⊂ L0 . Let us introduce the notation EPDX = infQ∈PD EQX ,
u(X) = infQ∈RD EQX , ρ(X) = −u(X) (we understand EQX according to the convention
of [5; Def. 2.3]).
Problem (agent-independent optimization): The problem is{
EPDX −→ max,
X ∈ A, ρ(X) ≤ c,
where c ∈ R+ . Clearly, if A is a cone, then this problem is obviously equivalent to the
problem of finding
R∗ = sup
X∈A
RAROC(X)
and
X∗ = argmax
X∈A
RAROC(X),
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where
RAROC(X) =

+∞ if EPDX > 0 and u(X) ≥ 0,
EPDX
ρ(X)
otherwise
with the convention 0
0
= 0, ∞
∞
= 0.
The only statement we can make at this level of generality is that
R∗ = inf
{
R > 0 :
( 1
1 +R
PD +
R
1 +R
RD
)
∩ R 6= ∅
}
,
which follows from [5; Th. 3.10]. Of course, in general X∗ need not exist.
We will now study the problem for a static model with a finite number of assets. Let
A = {〈h, S1 − S0〉 : h ∈ H} , where S0 ∈ R
d , S11 , . . . , S
d
1 ∈ L
1
w(RD), and H ⊆ R
d is a
closed convex cone (here we impose no conditions on D). Let us introduce the notation
(see Figure 1)
H∗ = {x ∈ Rd : ∀h ∈ H, 〈h, x〉 ≥ 0},
E = cl{EQS1 : Q ∈ PD},
G = cl{EQS1 : Q ∈ RD},
D = G+H∗,
(2.1)
where “cl” denotes the closure, and let D◦ denote the relative interior of D . (The set
G is the generator for S1 and u .) The sets E and G are convex compacts, while D is
convex and closed. Note that, for h ∈ H ,
EPD〈h, S1 − S0〉 = inf
x∈E
〈h, x− S0〉, (2.2)
u(〈h, S1 − S0〉) = inf
x∈G
〈h, x− S0〉 = inf
x∈D
〈h, x− S0〉. (2.3)
We will assume that S0 ∈ D
◦ \ E . This assumption is justified economically. Indeed,
if S0 ∈ E , then, in view of (2.2), RAROC(X) = 0 for any X ∈ A; if S0 /∈ D
◦ , then, in
view of (2.3), there exists X ∈ A with RAROC(X) = ∞ (provided that E belongs to
the relative interior of C ).
For λ > 0, we denote E(λ) = S0−λ(E−S0) and set λ∗ = sup{λ > 0 : E(λ)∩D 6= ∅} ,
N = {h∈H : ∃a∈R : ∀x∈E(λ∗), ∀y∈D, 〈h, x〉 ≤ a ≤ 〈h, y〉 and ∀y∈D
◦, 〈h, y〉 > a}.
Note that N is nonempty provided that λ∗ < ∞ . In the case, where λ∗ = ∞ , we set
N = H .
Theorem 2.1. We have R∗ = λ
−1
∗ and argmaxh∈H RAROC(〈h, S1 − S0〉) = N .
Proof. We will prove the statement for the case λ∗ < ∞ . The proof for the case
λ∗ =∞ is similar. Take T ∈ E(λ∗) ∩D and set U = S0 − λ
−1
∗ (T − S0).
If h ∈ N , then
RAROC(〈h, S1 − S0〉) =
infx∈E〈h, x− S0〉
− infx∈D〈h, x− S0〉
=
〈h, U − S0〉
−〈h, T − S0〉
= λ−1∗ .
If h ∈ H \N , then there are three possibilities:
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EG
D
E(λ∗)
E(λ)
S0
h∗
H
H∗
Figure 1. Solution of the optimization
problem. Here h∗ is an optimal h .
1) h is orthogonal to the smallest affine subspace containing D ;
2) supx∈E(λ∗)〈h, x〉 > 〈h, T 〉 ;
3) infx∈D〈h, x〉 < 〈h, T 〉 .
In the first case, RAROC(〈h, S1 − S0〉) = 0. In the second case,
inf
x∈E
〈h, x− S0〉 < 〈h, U − S0〉, inf
x∈D
〈h, x− S0〉 ≤ 〈h, T − S0〉,
so that RAROC(〈h, S1 − S0〉) < λ
−1
∗ . The third case is analyzed in a similar way. ✷
As a corollary, in the case, where PD = {P} and H = Rd , the solution to the
optimization problem is found as follows. Let T be the intersection of the ray (E, S0) (in
this case E = EPS1 ) with the border of G. Then
sup
h∈Rd
RAROC(〈h, S1 − S0〉) =
|EPS1 − S0|
|S0 − T |
and argmaxh∈Rd RAROC(〈h, S1 − S0〉) is
NG(T ) := {h ∈ R
d : ∀x ∈ G◦, 〈h, x− T 〉 > 0}.
In the case, where G has a nonempty interior, NG(T ) is the set of inner normals to G at
the point T .
T
S0
Eh∗ G
Figure 2. Solution of the optimization prob-
lem in the case PD = {P} and H = Rd
Important remark. In order to find the solution of the optimization problem for the
case PD = {P} , H = Rd , one needs to know the generating set G and the vector EPS1 .
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The empirical estimation of G is a problem similar to the empirical estimation of volatility,
and hence, it can be successfully accomplished. However, the empirical estimation of the
mean vector EPS1 is known to be a very unpleasant problem because it is very close to 0
(see the discussion in [3] and the 20’s example in [11]). But it turns out that the well-
known security market line relationship of Sharpe [22] helps to overcome this problem.
This relation states that
EP
(
S˜i1 − S˜
i
0
S˜i0
− r
)
= βiEP
(
S˜M1 − S˜
M
0
S˜M0
− r
)
, i = 1, . . . , d,
where r is the risk-free interest rate, S˜in = (1 + r)
nSin are true (not discounted) prices,
and S˜Mn is the price of the market portfolio at time n. Hence,
EP(S
i
1 − S
i
0) = β
iconst, i = 1, . . . , d.
The constant here contains as a factor the expected excess return on the market portfolio,
which is again hard to estimate. But note that for our purposes this unknown constant is
not needed! Indeed, the geometric solution of the optimization problem presented above
requires only the direction of the vector EPS1−S0 , and this depends only on (β
1, . . . , βd).
The following example shows that in natural situations the set of optimal strategies h∗
might not be unique (of course, the uniqueness of h∗ should be understood up to multi-
plication by a positive constant).
Example 2.2. Let S11 have a continuous distribution with ES1 < ∞ and take
S21 = (S
1
1 − K)
+ (so that the second asset is a call option on the first one). Let
PD = {P} , RD be the determining set of Tail V@R of order λ (see [5; Ex. 2.5]) and
H = R2 . Assume that F = σ(S11). It is easy to see that XRD(S
1
1) consists of a unique
element Q = λ−1I(S11 ≤ qλ)P, where qλ is the λ-quantile of S
1
1 . The border of G has
an angle pi/4 at the point T = EQ(S
1
1 , S
2
1) (see Figure 3). Let S0 =
T+EPS1
2
. Then
NG(T ) = {h ∈ R
2 : h1 ≥ 0, h2 ≥ −h1} . ✷
✲
✻
G
NG(T )
T
S0
E
K
Figure 3. Nonuniqueness of an optimal strategy
Let us now find the solution of the optimization problem in the Gaussian case.
Example 2.3. Let S1 have Gaussian distribution with mean a and covariance ma-
trix C . Let PD = {P} , H = Rd , and RD be the determining set of a law invariant
coherent utility function u that is finite on Gaussian random variables. Assume that S0
belongs to the relative interior of G and S0 6= a.
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There exists γ > 0 such that, for a Gaussian random variable ξ with mean m and
variance σ2 , we have u(ξ) = m − γσ . Let L denote the image of Rd under the map
x 7→ Cx. It is easy to see that
G = a+ {C1/2x : ‖x‖ ≤ γ} = a+ {y ∈ L : 〈y, C−1y〉 ≤ γ2}.
We have T = a + α(S0 − a) with some α > 0. It is easy to see that h ∈ ND(T ) if and
only if 〈h, a− S0〉 > 0 and, for any y ∈ L such that
d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
〈T − a+ εy, C−1(T − a + εy)〉 = 0,
we have 〈prLh, y〉 = 0. This means that prLh = c
′C−1(a− T ) = cC−1(a− S0) with some
constant c > 0. Thus,
ND(T ) = {h ∈ R
d : Ch = c(a− S0), c > 0}.
Note that this set does not depend on u !
It is easy to see that
R∗ =
|S0 − a|
|T − S0|
=
|S0 − a|
|T − a| − |S0 − a|
=
〈S0 − a, C
−1(S0 − a)〉
1/2
γ − 〈S0 − a, C−1(S0 − a)〉1/2
.
This equality can also be deduced from [5; Ex. 3.13]. ✷
2.2 Optimal Structure of a Firm
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, D ⊆ P be a convex set (we assume that P ∈ D)
and let X1, . . . , Xd ∈ L1w(D) be the discounted P&Ls produced by different components
of some firm.
We will consider the problem{
EP〈h,X〉 −→ max,
h ∈ Rd+, ρ(〈h,X〉) ≤ c,
(2.4)
where c is a positive constant meaning the capital available to the whole firm. From
the financial point of view, (2.4) is the problem of the central management of the firm
deciding which components should grow and which should shrink.
This is a particular case of the optimization problem of the previous subsection (with
PD = {P} , RD = D , and H = Rd+ ), so that we already have a geometric recipe to find
the optimal solution. Here we will present an economic characterization of optimality.
We will consider an arbitrary convex cone constraint H (not only Rd+ as in (2.4)). We
assume that EPX 6= 0 and that the generator G given by (2.1) is strictly convex, i.e. its
interior is nonempty and its border contains no interval.
Definition 2.4. We define the RAROC contribution of X to Y as
RAROCc(X ; Y ) =
EPX
ρc(X ; Y )
,
where ρc is the risk contribution (see [5; Subsect. 2.5]).
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The RAROC contribution is well defined provided that ρc(X ; Y ) is well defined and
ρc(X ; Y ) 6= 0.
Remarks. (i) The RAROC contribution may take on negative values.
(ii) We have RAROCc(X ;X) = RAROC(X).
Theorem 2.5. If h ∈ H and
RAROCc
(
h1X1;
d∑
i=1
hiX i
)
= · · · = RAROCc
(
hdXd;
d∑
i=1
hiX i
)
, (2.5)
then h ∈ argmaxh∈H RAROC(〈h,X〉) and all the elements of this equality are equal to R∗ .
Conversely, if h is an inner point of H and h ∈ argmaxh∈H RAROC(〈h,X〉),
then (2.5) is satisfied.
Proof. Denote
∑
hiX i by Y . It is seen from [5; Th. 2.16] that
uc(hiX i; Y ) = hiuc(X i; Y ). Repeating the arguments of the proof of [5; Th. 2.12], we
get uc(X i; Y ) = U i , where U = argminx∈G〈h, x〉 (this point is unique due to the convex-
ity of G). Thus, (2.5) is equivalent to: EPX = −RU , where R = RAROC
c(hiX i; Y ).
It is seen from the results of the previous subsection that this condition implies that
h ∈ argmaxh∈Rd RAROC(〈h,X〉). As u(〈h,X〉) = 〈h, U〉 , we get RAROC(〈h,X〉) = R ,
so that R∗ = R .
Conversely, if h is an inner point of H , then argminx∈D〈h, x〉 = argminx∈G〈h, x〉 = U
(D is given by (2.1)). Recalling the results of the previous subsection, we get the second
statement. ✷
Remark. The additional assumption that h is in the interior of H is essential for the
converse statement of Theorem 2.5. As an example, take H = {αh0 : α ∈ R+} , where
h0 is a fixed vector. Then clearly h0 ∈ argmaxh∈H RAROC(〈h,X〉), but of course (2.5)
might be violated.
2.3 Single-Agent Global Optimization
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, u be a coherent utility function with the weakly
compact determining set D , A ⊆ L0 be a D -consistent convex cone, and W ∈ L1s(D).
From the financial point of view, W is the terminal endowment of some agent, while A
is the set of discounted P&Ls the agent can obtain by trading.
Problem (single-agent global optimization): Find
u∗ = sup
X∈A
u(W +X)
and
X∗ = argmax
X∈A
u(W +X).
Proposition 2.6. We have
u∗ = inf
Q∈D∩R
EQW,
where inf ∅ :=∞.
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Proof. By [5; Th. 3.4], for any z ∈ R,
sup
X∈A
u(W +X) > z ⇐⇒ sup
X∈A
u(−z +W +X) > 0 ⇐⇒ D ∩R(−z +W + A) = ∅
(the notation R(A) was introduced in [5; Def. 3.1]). Fix Q ∈ R(−z +W + A). As A
is a cone, we have EQX ≤ 0 for any X ∈ A. As A contains zero, EQ(−z +W ) ≤ 0.
Thus, Q ∈ R and EQ(−z +W ) ≤ 0. Conversely, if Q ∈ D and these two conditions are
satisfied, then Q ∈ R(−z +W + A). We get
sup
X∈A
u(W +X) > z ⇐⇒ D ∩R ∩ {Q : EQW ≤ z} = ∅,
and the result follows. ✷
We will now study the problem for a static model with a finite number of assets. Let
A = {〈h,X〉 : h ∈ H} , where X = (X1, . . . , Xd) ∈ L1w(D) and H ⊆ R
d is a closed
convex cone (here we impose no conditions on D). For the case H = Rd , we provided
a geometric solution of this problem in [5; Subsect. 3.6]. For an arbitrary H , it is more
complicated and is given below. Let us introduce the notation (see Figure 4)
G = cl{EQ(X,W ) : Q ∈ D},
H˜ = {x ∈ Rd+1 : (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ H, xd+1 = 1},
H˜∗ = {x ∈ Rd+1 : ∀h ∈ H˜, 〈h, x〉 ≤ 0},
e = (0, . . . , 0, 1),
λ∗ = inf{λ ∈ R : (λe + H˜
∗) ∩G 6= ∅},
N˜ = {h ∈ Rd+1 : hd+1 = 1 and ∃a ∈ R :
∀x ∈ λ∗e+ H˜
∗, ∀y ∈ G, 〈h, x〉 ≤ a ≤ 〈h, y〉},
N = {h ∈ Rd : (h, 1) ∈ N˜}.
If λ∗ =∞ , we set N˜ = N = ∅ .
Theorem 2.7. We have u∗ = λ∗ and argmaxh∈H u(W + 〈h,X〉) = N .
Proof. Fix λ < λ∗ . As G is a convex compact and H˜
∗ is convex and closed, there
exist h˜ ∈ Rd+1 and a, b ∈ R such that, for any x ∈ λe + H˜∗ and any y ∈ G, we have
〈h˜, x〉 ≤ a < b ≤ 〈h˜, y〉 . As G is compact, h˜ can be chosen in such a way that h˜d+1 6= 0.
Since H˜∗ ⊇ {αe : α ≤ 0} , we have h˜d+1 > 0. Without loss of generality, h˜d+1 = 1.
Then, for any x ∈ H˜∗ , we have 〈h˜, x〉 ≤ a − λ . As H˜∗ is a cone, for any x ∈ H˜∗ ,
we have 〈h˜, x〉 ≤ 0 and a − λ ≥ 0. Let h be the d-dimensional vector that consists of
the first d components of h˜ . Assume that h /∈ H . Then in the d-dimensional plane
{x ∈ Rd+1 : xd+1 = 1} we can select a (d−1)-dimensional plane L that separates h˜ from
H˜ . Consider the d-dimensional plane generated by the origin of Rd and L, and let x be
its normal. Then 〈h˜, x〉 > 0, while supg∈H˜〈g, x〉 ≤ 0. Consequently, x ∈ H˜
∗ , but then
we get a contradiction with the choice of h˜. As a result, h ∈ H . Furthermore,
u(W + 〈h,X〉) = inf
Q∈D
EQ(W + 〈h,X〉) = inf
x∈G
〈h˜, x〉 > λ.
As λ < λ∗ has been chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that suph∈H u(W + 〈h,X〉) ≥ λ∗ .
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✲✻{
1
R
d
R
e
h∗
h˜∗
G
H˜
H˜∗
H˜∗λ
Figure 4. Solution of the optimization
problem. By H˜∗λ we denote λ∗e + H˜
∗ .
Here N˜ = {h˜∗} and N = {h∗}.
Let us prove the reverse inequality. We can assume that λ∗ < ∞ . Let
x0 ∈ (λ∗e+ H˜
∗) ∩G. Fix h ∈ H and set h˜ = (h, 1). Then
u(W + 〈h,X〉) = inf
x∈G
〈h˜, x〉 ≤ 〈h˜, x0〉.
We can write x0 = λ∗e + z0 with z0 ∈ H˜
∗ . Then 〈h˜, x0〉 = λ∗ + 〈h˜, z0〉 ≤ λ∗ . Thus,
suph∈H u(W + 〈h,X〉) ≤ λ∗ . As a result, u∗ = λ∗ .
Let us prove the equality argmaxh∈H u(W + 〈h,X〉) = N . In the case λ∗ = ∞ , its
left-hand side and its right-hand side are empty, so it is trivially satisfied. Assume now
that λ∗ <∞ . Let h ∈ N . Using the same arguments as above, we show that h ∈ H . For
h˜ = (h, 1), there exists a ∈ R such that, for any x ∈ λ∗e + H˜
∗ and any y ∈ G, we have
〈h, x〉 ≤ a ≤ 〈h, y〉 . The same arguments as above show that a ≥ λ∗ . Consequently,
u(W + 〈h,X〉) = inf
x∈G
〈h˜, x〉 ≥ a ≥ λ∗.
Let h ∈ H be such that u(W + 〈h,X〉) = λ∗ . This means that, for h˜ = (h, 1),
we have infx∈G〈h˜, x〉 ≥ λ∗ . Furthermore, for any x = λ∗e + z ∈ λ∗e + H˜
∗ , we have
〈h˜, x〉 = 〈h˜, λ∗e〉+ 〈h˜, z〉 ≤ λ∗ . Thus, h˜ ∈ N˜ , which means that h ∈ N . ✷
Example 2.8. (i) Let H = Rd . Then H˜ = {e} , H˜∗ = {αe : α ≤ 0} , and
λ∗ = inf{x
d+1 : x ∈ G0} , where G0 = G ∩ ({0} × R). The condition that there ex-
ists no X ∈ A with u(X) > 0 is equivalent to: G0 6= ∅ . If G
◦ ∩ ({0}×R) 6= ∅ , where G◦
denotes the relative interior of G, then N 6= ∅ . If G◦ ∩ ({0} × R) = ∅ , then both cases
N 6= ∅ and N = ∅ are possible (see Figure 5).
(ii) Let H = Rd+ . Then H˜ = R
d
+ × {1} , H˜
∗ = Rd+1− , and λ∗ = inf{x
d+1 : x ∈ G−} ,
where G− = G ∩ (R
d
− × R). ✷
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✲✻
✲
✻{
1
r r
R
d
R
d
R R
G G
e e
h˜∗
h∗
H˜∗ H˜∗
Figure 5. Existence (right) and nonexistence
(left) of an optimal strategy for the case H = Rd
2.4 Single-Agent Local Optimization
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, u be a coherent utility function with the weakly
compact determining set D , A ⊂ L0 be a D -consistent convex set containing zero, and
W ∈ L1s(D). The financial interpretation is the same as above. As opposed to Subsec-
tion 2.3, we assume that supX∈A,Q∈D |EQX| < ∞ and A ⊆ L
1
s(D). From the financial
point of view, we have a “big” investor possessing a capital with the terminal wealth W
and considering several trading opportunities, each of which is small as compared to W .
Mathematically, we consider the following problem.
Problem (single-agent local optimization): Find
u∗ = lim
ε↓0
ε−1
[
sup
X∈A
u(W + εX)− u(W )
]
and an element X∗ ∈ A, for which
lim
ε↓0
ε−1[u(W + εX∗)− u(W )] = u∗. (2.6)
The statement below shows that the problem posed above is equivalent to the problem
of maximizing uc(X ;W ) = infQ∈XD(Y ) EQX over A.
Proposition 2.9. We have u∗ = supX∈A u
c(X ;W ). Furthermore, X∗ solves (2.6) if
and only if X∗ ∈ argmaxX∈A u
c(X ;W ).
Proof. The inequality
lim sup
ε↓0
ε−1
(
sup
X∈A
u(W + εX)− u(W )
)
≤ lim sup
ε↓0
ε−1
(
sup
X∈A
(
inf
Q∈XD(W )
EQ(W + εX)− u(W )
))
= lim sup
ε↓0
ε−1 sup
x∈A
ε inf
Q∈XD(W )
EQX
= sup
X∈A
uc(X ;W ),
combined with [5; Th. 2.16], shows that u∗ ≤ supX∈A u
c(X ;W ). The reverse inequality
and the second statement follow immediately from [5; Th. 2.16]. ✷
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Thus, the problem of single-agent local optimization is equivalent to maximizing an-
other coherent utility over A (namely, uc( · ;W )). We will now consider a problem of
maximizing a coherent utility, which we still denote by u , over A for a static model with
a finite number of assets. Let A = {〈h,X〉 : h ∈ H} , where X = (X1, . . . , Xd) ∈ L1w(D)
and H ⊂ Rd is a convex compact (here we impose no conditions on the determining set D
of u). Let us introduce the notation (see Figure 6)
G = cl{EQX : Q ∈ D},
H∗ = {x ∈ Rd : ∀h ∈ H, 〈h, x〉 ≤ 1},
λ∗ = inf{λ ≥ 0 : λH
∗ ∩G 6= ∅},
N =
{
{h : ∀x ∈ λ∗H
∗, ∀y ∈ G, 〈h, x〉 ≤ λ∗ ≤ 〈h, y〉} if λ∗ > 0,
∅ if λ∗ = 0.
Note that λ∗ <∞ , N 6= ∅ , and N ⊆ H .
r
0
GH
H∗
λ∗H
∗
h∗
Figure 6. Solution of the optimization
problem. Here h∗ is the optimal h .
Theorem 2.10. We have supX∈A u(X) = λ∗ and argmaxh∈H u(〈h,X〉) = N .
Proof. Let λ∗ > 0. For h ∈ N , we have
u(〈h,X〉) = inf
x∈G
〈h, x〉 = λ∗.
For h ∈ H \N , we have supx∈λ∗H∗〈h, x〉 ≤ λ∗ , and consequently,
u(〈h, x〉) = inf
x∈G
〈h, x〉 < λ∗.
The case λ∗ = 0 is analyzed trivially. ✷
2.5 Liquidity Effects in the NGD Pricing
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, u be a coherent utility function with the weakly
compact determining set D , and A ⊂ L0 be a convex set containing zero. We assume
that there exists no X ∈ A with u(X) > 0.
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Definition 2.11. We define the upper and lower utility-based NGD price functions of
a contingent claim F as
V (F, v) = sup{x : the model (Ω,F ,P,D, A− v(F − x)) satisfies the NGD}, v > 0,
V (F, v) = inf{x : the model (Ω,F ,P,D, A+ v(F − x)) satisfies the NGD}, v > 0.
From the financial point of view, v means the volume of a trade.
Remark. If A is a cone, then
V (F, · ) ≡ inf{x : ∃X ∈ A : u(X − F + x) ≥ 0},
V (F, · ) ≡ sup{x : ∃X ∈ A : u(X + F − x) ≥ 0}.
These are the upper and the lower prices, which were studied in [5; Subsect. 3.6]. Thus,
the investigation of V (F, v) and V (F, v) is meaningful only if A does not have a cone
structure. This corresponds to the liquidity effects.
In view of the equality V (F, v) = −V (−F, v), it is sufficient to study only the prop-
erties of V (F, · ).
Theorem 2.12. Let F ∈ L1s(D).
(i) The function V (F, · ) is increasing and continuous.
(ii) We have
lim
v↓0
V (F, v) = sup
Q∈D∩R
EQF.
(iii) We have
lim
v→∞
V (F, v) ≤ sup
Q∈D
EQF.
If supX∈A,Q∈D |EQX| <∞, then
lim
v→∞
V (F, v) = sup
Q∈D
EQF.
Proof. (i) It follows from the equality
sup
X∈A
u(−v(F − x) +X) = vx+ sup
X∈A
u(−vF +X)
that V (F, v) = −v−1f(v), where f(v) = supX∈A u(−vF +X). Note that f is finite due
to the NGD and the condition F ∈ L1s(D). Fix v1, v2 > 0, ε > 0, α ∈ [0, 1] and find
X1, X2 ∈ A such that u(−viF +Xi) ≥ f(vi)− ε , i = 1, 2. Then
f(αv1 + (1− α)v2) ≥ u(−(αv1 + (1− α)v2)F + αX1 + (1− α)X2)
≥ αu(−v1F +X1) + (1− α)u(−v2F +X2)
≥ αf(v1) + (1− α)f(v2)− ε.
Consequently, f is concave. As A contains zero and the NGD is satisfied, we have
f(0) = 0. This leads to the desired statement.
(ii) By Proposition 2.6,
sup
X∈coneA
u(−vF +X) = inf
Q∈D∩R
EQ(−vF ) = −v sup
Q∈D∩R
EQF,
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where “cone” denotes the cone hull. Take ε > 0 and find X0 ∈ A, α0 ≥ 0 such that
u(−F + α0X0) ≥ − sup
Q∈D∩R
EQF − ε.
As the function R+ ∋ x 7→ u(−xF + xα0X0) is concave and vanishes at zero, we have
u(−vF + vα0X0) ≥ v
(
− sup
Q∈D∩R
EQF − ε
)
, v ≤ 1.
As ε > 0 has been chosen arbitrarily, we get
lim sup
v↓0
V (F, v) = lim sup
v↓0
(−v−1f(v)) ≤ sup
Q∈D∩R
EQF.
Combining this with the inequality
sup
X∈A
u(−vF +X) ≤ sup
X∈A
inf
Q∈D∩R
EQ(−vF +X) = inf
Q∈D∩R
EQ(−vF ) = −v sup
Q∈D∩R
EQF,
we get the desired statement.
(iii) The first statement follows from the inequality
sup
X∈A
u(−vF +X) ≥ u(−vF ) = −v sup
Q∈D
EQF.
The second statement is an obvious consequence of the equality
V (F, v) = − supX∈A u(−F + v
−1X). ✷
Remarks. (i) If A is a cone, then clearly V (F, · ) = const.
(ii) If supX∈A,Q∈D |EQX| <∞ , then
V (F,∞)− V (F,∞) = sup
Q∈D
F − inf
Q∈D
F,
which is the length of the NGD price interval in the absence of a market. The difference
V (F, 0)− V (F, 0) = sup
Q∈D∩R
F − inf
Q∈D∩R
F
is the length of the NGD price interval in the presence of a market. Thus, the ratio
V (F, 0)− V (F, 0)
V (F,∞)− V (F,∞)
measures the “closeness” of a new instrument F to those already existing in the market.
Example 2.13. Consider a static model with a finite number of assets, i.e.
A = {〈h,X〉 : h ∈ H} , where X = (X1, . . . , Xd) ∈ L1w(D) and H ⊂ R
d is a convex
bounded set. Assume that H contains a neighborhood of zero. Consider the generator
G = {EQ(X,F ) : Q ∈ D} . Then
V (F, 0) = sup{xd+1 : x1 = · · · = xd = 0, x ∈ G},
V (F,∞) = sup{xd+1 : x ∈ G}.
Note that these values do not depend on H ! ✷
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R
d
R
G
V (F,∞)
V (F, 0)
V (F, 0)
V (F,∞)
Figure 7. The form of V (F, 0),
V (F,∞), V (F, 0), and V (F,∞)
3 Optimality Pricing
3.1 Agent-Independent Optimality Pricing
Consider the model of [5; Subsect. 3.2]. Thus, we are given a probability space (Ω,F ,P),
a convex weakly compact set RD ⊂ P , an L1 -closed convex set PD ⊂ RD , and a convex
set A ⊂ L0 . Assume that R∗ <∞ , where R∗ = supX∈ARAROC(X). It follows from [5;
Th. 3.10] that
R∗ = inf
{
R ≥ 0 :
( 1
1 +R
PD +
R
1 +R
RD
)
∩R 6= ∅
}
and D∗ ∩R 6= ∅ , where
D∗ =
1
1 +R∗
PD +
R∗
1 +R∗
RD.
PD
D∗
RD
R
D∗∩R
Figure 8. The structure of D∗ ∩R
Definition 3.1. An agent-independent NBC price of a contingent claim F is a real
number x such that
sup
X∈A+A(x)
RAROC(X) = sup
X∈A
RAROC(X),
where A(x) = {h(F − x) : h ∈ R} .
The set of the NBC prices will be denoted by INBC(F ).
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This pricing technique corresponds to the agent-independent optimization. A price x
is fair if adding to the market a new instrument with the initial price x and the terminal
price F does not increase the optimal value in the optimization problem.
Proposition 3.2. For F ∈ L1s(RD),
INBC(F ) = {EQF : Q ∈ D∗ ∩ R}.
Proof. If x ∈ INBC(F ), then, by [5; Th. 3.10], there exists Q ∈ D∗ ∩ R(A + A(x)).
This means that Q ∈ D∗ ∩ R and EQF = x.
Conversely, if x = EQF with some Q ∈ D∗∩R, then, for any X+h(F−x) ∈ A+A(x),
we have EQX ≤ 0, so that Q ∈ R(A + A(x)). Due to [5; Th. 3.10],
supX∈A+A(x)RAROC(X) ≤ R∗ . ✷
The following statement yields a more definite representation of D∗ ∩ R.
Proposition 3.3. If X∗ ∈ argmaxX∈ARAROC(X), then
D∗ ∩R =
(
1
1 +R∗
XPD(X∗) +
R∗
1 +R∗
XRD(X∗)
)
∩ R. (3.1)
Proof. Take
Q =
1
1 +R∗
Q1 +
R∗
1 +R∗
Q2 ∈ D∗ ∩ R.
We have
inf
Q∈PD
EQX∗ +R∗ inf
Q∈RD
EQX∗ ≤ EQ1X∗ +R∗EQ2X∗ ≤ 0
(the second inequality follows from the inclusion Q ∈ R). Combining this with the
equality
RAROC(X∗) =
infQ∈PD EQX∗
− infQ∈RD EQX∗
= R∗,
we get
inf
Q∈PD
EQX∗ +R∗ inf
Q∈RD
EQX∗ ≤ EQ1X∗ +R∗EQ2X∗.
This means that Q1 ∈ XPD(X∗) and Q2 ∈ XRD(X∗). ✷
As a corollary, if XPD(X∗) and XRD(X∗) are singletons (this is true, for instance,
if PD = {P} , RD is the determining set of Weighted V@R, and X∗ has a continuous
distribution; see [6]), then R can be removed from (3.1), i.e.
D∗ ∩R =
1
1 +R∗
XPD(X∗) +
R∗
1 +R∗
XRD(X∗).
But in general this equality might be violated as shown by the example below.
Example 3.4. Let PD = {P} , RD be the determining set of Tail
V@R with λ < 1/2, and X1 , X2 be independent random variables with
P(X1 = −1) = P(X1 = 2) = 1/2, P(X2 = ±1) = 1/2. Let A = {h1X1 + h2X2 : hi ∈ R} .
For any (h1, h2) with h1 ≥ 0, we have
inf
Q∈RD
EQ(h
1X1 + h2X2) ≤ EPZ(h
1X1 + h2X2) = h1EPZX
1 = inf
Q∈RD
EQX
1,
where Z = 2I(X = −1). Combining this with the equality EP(h
1X1 + h2X2) = h1EPX
1 ,
we get that X1 ∈ argmaxX∈ARAROC(X). On the other hand, there exists
Q ∈ XRD(X
1), for which EQX
2 6= 0. Thus, the set 1
1+R∗
XPD(X
1) + R∗
1+R∗
XRD(X
1)
contains measures that do not belong to R. ✷
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Remark. One of techniques for pricing in incomplete markets consists in finding the
representative of the set of risk-neutral measures that is the closest one to P in some sense
(typically the relative entropy or some other measure of distance is minimized). Note that
the set D∗ ∩R is exactly the set of measures Q from R that are the closest ones to PD ,
the “distance” being measured by
inf
{
R : ∃Q1 ∈ PD, Q2 ∈ RD :
1
1 +R
Q1 +
R
1 +R
Q2 = Q
}
.
We will now study the problem for a static model with a finite number of assets. Let
A = {〈h, S1 − S0〉 : h ∈ H} , where S0 ∈ R
d , S11 , . . . , S
d
1 ∈ L
1
w(RD), and H ⊆ R
d is a
closed convex cone. Assume that 0 < R∗ < ∞ . Let F ∈ L
1
w(D) be a contingent claim.
Let us introduce the notation (see Figure 9)
H∗ = {x ∈ Rd : ∀h ∈ H, 〈h, x〉 ≥ 0},
H˜∗ = H∗ × {0},
E˜ = cl{EQ(S1, F ) : Q ∈ PD},
G˜ = cl{EQ(S1, F ) : Q ∈ RD},
D˜ = G˜+ H˜∗,
D˜R =
1
1 +R
E˜ +
R
1 +R
D˜.
E˜
G˜ D˜
D˜R
D˜R∗
R
d
R
S0
INBC(F )
✲
✻
r
Figure 9. The form of INBC . Here
INBC(F ) consists of one point.
Theorem 3.5. We have
R∗ = inf{R > 0 : D˜R ∩ ({S0} × R) 6= ∅}, (3.2)
INBC(F ) = {x : (S0, x) ∈ D˜R∗}. (3.3)
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Proof. Denote
E = cl{EQS1 : Q ∈ PD},
G = cl{EQS1 : Q ∈ RD},
D = G+H∗,
DR =
1
1 +R
E +
R
1 +R
D.
Note that E = pr
Rd E˜ , G = prRd G˜, H
∗ = pr
Rd H˜
∗ , and consequently, D = pr
Rd D˜ ,
DR = prRd D˜R . Combining this with the results of Subsection 2.1, we get
R∗ = inf{R > 0 : DR ∋ S0} = inf{R > 0 : D˜R ∩ ({S0} × R) 6= ∅}.
Furthermore, for any x ∈ R,
sup
A+A(x)
RAROC(X) = inf{R > 0 : D˜R ∋ (S0, x)}.
This, combined with (3.2), proves (3.3). ✷
To conclude this subsection, we find the form of INBC(F ) in the Gaussian case.
Example 3.6. Consider the setting of [5; Ex. 3.13]. Clearly, R∗ is the solution of
the equation 〈S0 − a, C
−1(S0 − a)〉 =
γ2R2∗
1+R2∗
(cf. Example 2.3). This, combined with the
form of INGD (R)(F ) found in [5; Ex. 3.13], shows that INBC(F ) consists of a unique point
〈b, S0−a〉+EF . Let us remark that this value coincides with the fair price of F obtained
as a result of the mean-variance hedging. Note that this value does not depend on u ! ✷
3.2 Single-Agent Optimality Pricing
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, u be a coherent utility function with the weakly
compact determining set D , A ⊆ L0 be a D -consistent convex set containing zero, and
W ∈ L1s(D). The financial interpretation is the same as in Subsection 2.3.
Definition 3.7. A single-agent NBC price of a contingent claim F is a real number x
such that
max
X∈A,h∈R
u(W +X + h(F − x)) = u(W ).
The set of the NBC prices will be denoted by INBC(F ).
This pricing technique corresponds to the global single-agent optimization. A price x
is fair if adding to the market a new instrument with the initial price x and the terminal
price F does not increase the optimal value in the optimization problem.
Theorem 3.8. For F ∈ L1s(D),
INBC(F ) = {EQF : Q ∈ XD(W ) ∩R}. (3.4)
Remark. The set of the NBC prices is nonempty only if W is optimal in the sense that
maxX∈A u(W +X) = u(W ). However, if W is not optimal, then, as seen from the proof
of Theorem 3.8, XD(W ) ∩ R = ∅ , so that (3.4) still holds.
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Proof of Theorem 3.8. As A contains zero and the function R+ ∋ α 7→ u(W +αX)
is concave for a fixed X , the condition x ∈ INBC(F ) is equivalent to:
max
X∈coneA,h∈R
u(W +X + h(F − x)) = u(W ).
By Proposition 2.6, this is equivalent to:
inf
Q∈D∩R(A+A(x))
EQW = inf
Q∈D
EQW,
where A(x) = {h(F − x) : h ∈ R} . Clearly, the latter condition is equivalent to:
XD(W ) ∩ R(A + A(x)) 6= ∅ . It is easy to verify that this is equivalent to: x = EQF
for some Q ∈ XD(W ) ∩ R. ✷
Let us now provide a geometric representation of INBC(F ) (see Figure 10). Assume
that u(W ) = maxX∈A u(W +X) (the reasoning used above shows that this is equivalent
to: XD(W ) ∩ R 6= ∅). Consider the generator G = {EQ(F,W ) : Q ∈ D ∩ R} and the
function f(x) = inf{y : (x, y) ∈ G} (we set inf ∅ = +∞).
✲
✻
r
x
y
G
D
f(x)
INBC(D,A,W )(F )
=INBC(D,W )(F )
INGD(D,A)(F )
INGD(D)(F )
Figure 10. Comparison of various price in-
tervals. Here G = {EQ(F,W ) : Q ∈ D ∩ R}
and D = {EQ(F,W ) : Q ∈ D}. In this ex-
ample, INBC(D,A,W )(F ) = INBC(D,W )(F ).
Corollary 3.9. For F ∈ L1s(D),
INBC(F ) = argmin
x∈R
f(x).
Proof. It is sufficient to note that
min
x∈R
f(x) = min
Q∈D∩R
EQW = u(W )
and
f(x) = inf{EQW : Q ∈ D ∩R(A + A(x))},
where A(x) = {h(F − x) : h ∈ R} . Thus, x ∈ argminx∈R f(x) if and only if
XD(W )∩R(A+A(x)) 6= ∅ , which, in view of Theorem 3.8, is equivalent to the inclusion
x ∈ INBC(F ). ✷
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Assume that W is optimal in the sense that
u(W ) = max
X∈A
u(W +X) (3.5)
and suppose moreover that the set INBC(D,W )(F ) of the NBC prices based on D and
W (with A = 0) consists of one point x0 (this condition is satisfied if the set
D = {EQ(F,W ) : Q ∈ D} is strictly convex; see Figure 10). It is seen from the proof
of Theorem 3.8 that condition (3.5) is equivalent to: XD(W ) ∩ R 6= ∅ . Then it fol-
lows from Theorem 3.8 that INBC(D,A,W )(F ) 6= ∅ (we assume that F ∈ L
1
s(D)). Clearly,
INBC(D,A,W )(F ) ⊆ INBC(D,W )(F ). As a result, INBC(D,A,W )(F ) = {x0} . So, in this situa-
tion A can be eliminated. This situation occurs naturally as shown, in particular, by the
example below.
Example 3.10. Let u be a law invariant coherent utility function that is finite on
Gaussian random variables. Assume that u(W ) = maxX∈A u(W + X) and that (W,F )
has a Gaussian distribution.
There exists γ > 0 such that, for a Gaussian random variable ξ with mean m and
variance σ2 , we have u(ξ) = m − γσ . Clearly, INBC(F ) ⊆ J , where J is the NBC price
based on D and W with A = 0. Using Corollary 3.9, we deduce that J consists of a
single point EF − γ cov(F,W )
(varW )1/2
. As INBC(F ) is nonempty, it consists of the same point. ✷
3.3 Multi-Agent Optimality Pricing
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, u1, . . . , uN be coherent utility functions with the
weakly compact determining sets D1, . . . ,DN , A ⊆ L
0 be a convex set containing zero,
and W1 ∈ L
1
s(D1), . . . ,WN ∈ L
1
s(DN). From the financial point of view, un , A, and Wn
are the coherent utility function, the set of attainable P&Ls, and the terminal endowment
of the n-th agent, respectively. We will assume that there exists a set A′ ⊆
⋂
n L
1
s(Dn)∩A
such that, for any n, Dn ∩R = Dn ∩R(A
′). We also assume that each Wn is optimal in
the sense that un(Wn) = maxX∈A un(Wn +X).
Definition 3.11. A real number x is amulti-agent NBC price of a contingent claim F
if there exists no element X ∈ A+ {h(F − x) : h ∈ R} such that un(Wn +X) > un(Wn)
for any n.
The set of the NBC prices will be denoted by INBC(F ).
From the financial point of view, a price x is fair if adding to the market a new
instrument with the initial price x and the terminal price F does not produce a trading
opportunity that is attractive to all the agents.
Theorem 3.12. For F ∈
⋂
n L
1
s(Dn),
INBC(F ) = conv
N
n=1 INBC(Dn,A,Wn)(F ) =
{
EQF : Q ∈ conv
N
n=1(XDn(Wn) ∩ R)
}
,
where INBC(Dn,A,Wn)(F ) is the interval of the single-agent NBC prices based on Dn ,
A, Wn .
Proof. Let x ∈ INBC(F ). Fix X1, . . . , XM ∈ A
′ . It follows from the weak conti-
nuity of the maps Dn ∋ Q 7→ EQ(X1, . . . , XM , F ) that, for each n = 1, . . . , N , the set
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Gn = {EQ(X1, . . . , XM , F − x) : Q ∈ Xn} , where Xn = XDn(Wn), is compact. Clearly,
Gn is convex. Suppose that (
convNn=1Gn
)
∩ (RM− × {0}) = ∅.
Then there exists h ∈ RM+1 such that h1, . . . , hM ≥ 0 and infx∈Gn〈h, x〉 > 0 for each n.
This means that infQ∈Xn EQY > 0 for each n, where Y = h
1X1+· · ·+h
mXm+h
m+1(F−x).
Employing [5; Th. 2.16], we conclude that there exists ε > 0 such that
u(Wn + εY ) > u(Wn) for any n.
The obtained contradiction shows that, for any X1, . . . , XM ∈ A
′ , the set
B(X1, . . . , XM) =
{
α1, . . . , αN ,Q1, . . . ,QN ∈ S ×
N∏
n=1
Xn :
N∑
n=1
αnEQnF = x
and ∀n = 1, . . . , N, ∀m = 1, . . . ,M, EQnXm ≤ 0
}
,
where S =
{
α1, . . . , αN ≥ 0 :
∑N
n=1 αn = 1
}
, is nonempty. As the map Xn ∋ Q 7→ EQX is
weakly continuous for each X ∈ L1s(Dn), the set B(X1, . . . , XM) is closed with respect to
the product of weak topologies. Furthermore, any finite intersection of sets of this form is
nonempty. Tikhonov’s theorem ensures that S ×
∏
nXn is compact. Consequently, there
exists a collection α1, . . . , αN ,Q1, . . . ,QN that belongs to each B of this form. Then
EQnX ≤ 0 for any n and any X ∈ A
′ , which means that Qn ∈ Xn ∩ R. Thus, the
measure Q =
∑
n αnQn belongs to convn(Xn ∩ R) and EQF = x.
Now, let x = EQF with Q =
∑
n αnQn , Qn ∈ Xn ∩ R. Suppose that there exist
X ∈ A, h ∈ R such that, for Y = X + h(F − x), we have un(Wn + Y ) > un(Wn) for
each n. Due to the concavity of the function α 7→ un(Wn + αY ), we get
un(Wn + Y )− un(Wn) ≤ lim sup
ε↓0
ε−1(un(Wn + εY )− un(Wn))
≤ lim sup
ε↓0
ε−1
(
inf
Q∈Xn
EQ(Wn + εY )− un(Wn)
)
= inf
Q∈Xn
EQY.
Consequently, EQnY > 0 for each n, and therefore, EQY > 0. But, on the other
hand, Q ∈ R, and therefore, EQY ≤ EQh(F − x) = 0. The contradiction shows that
x ∈ INBC(F ). ✷
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Unconstrained Equilibrium
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, u1, . . . , uN be coherent utility functions with the
weakly compact determining sets D1, . . . ,DN , A1, . . . , AN ⊆ L
0 be convex cones such
that An is Dn -consistent for each n, and let W1 ∈ L
1
s(D1), . . . ,WN ∈ L
1
s(DN). From the
financial point of view, un , An , and Wn are the coherent utility function, the “personal”
set of attainable P&Ls, and the terminal endowment of the n-th agent, respectively. Let
us introduce the notation D =
⋂
nDn .
Definition 4.1. The maximal overall utility is defined as
M = sup
Xn∈An
Yn∈L1s(D) :
∑
nYn=0
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + Yn),
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where the sum is understood as −∞ if any of the summands equals −∞ .
Proposition 4.2. We have
M = inf
Q∈
⋂
nDn∩R(An)
EQW,
where W :=
∑
nWn and inf ∅ :=∞.
Lemma 4.3. Let u1, . . . , uN be coherent utility functions with the weakly compact
determining sets D1, . . . ,DN . Then, for any X ∈ L
∞ ,
sup
Xn∈L∞ :
∑
nXn=X
N∑
n=1
un(Xn) = inf
Q∈
⋂
nDn
EQX. (4.1)
Remark. The left-hand side of (4.1) is called the convex convolution or the sup-
convolution of u1, . . . , uN (see [2], [8; Sect. 5.2]). Thus, Lemma 4.3 states that it is a
coherent utility function with the determining set
⋂
nDn if
⋂
nDn 6= ∅ and it is identi-
cally equal to +∞ if
⋂
nDn = ∅ .
Proof of Lemma 4.3. In the case, where
⋂
nDn 6= ∅ , this statement follows by
induction from a result proved in [8; Sect. 5.2].
Assume now that
⋂
nDn = ∅ . Find m such that
⋂m
n=1Dn 6= ∅ , while
⋂m+1
n=1 Dn = ∅ .
By the Hahn-Banach theorem, there exists Z ∈ L∞ such that
sup
Q∈Dm+1
EQZ < 0 < inf
Q∈
⋂m
n=1Dn
EQZ.
According to the part of the lemma that has already been proved, there ex-
ist Z1, . . . , Zm ∈ L
∞ such that
∑m
n=1Zn = Z and
∑m
n=1 un(Zn) > 0. Then
u1(Z1) + · · · + um(Zm) + um+1(−Z) > 0. Consequently, the left-hand side of (4.1) is
identically equal to ∞ . ✷
Proof of Proposition 4.2. For any X1 ∈ A1, . . . , XN ∈ AN , Y1, . . . , YN ∈ L
1
s(D)
such that
∑
n Yn = 0, and any Q ∈
⋂
nDn ∩R(An), we have
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + Yn) ≤
N∑
n=1
EQ(Wn +Xn + Yn) ≤
N∑
n=1
EQ(Wn + Yn) = EQW
(to get the second inequality, we used the inclusions Wn ∈ L
1(Q), Yn ∈ L
1(Q)). Conse-
quently,
M ≤ inf
Q∈
⋂
nDn∩R(An)
EQW.
Let us prove the reverse inequality. Clearly, it is sufficient to prove it for bounded Wn
(since arbitrary Wn ∈ L
1
s(Dn) can be approximated by bounded ones). Proposition 2.6
and Lemma 4.3 combined together yield
M ≥ sup
Xn∈An
Yn∈L∞ :
∑
nYn=0
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + Yn)
= sup
Yn∈L∞ :
∑
nYn=0
N∑
n=1
inf
Q∈Dn∩R(An)
EQ(Wn + Yn)
= inf
Q∈
⋂
nDn∩R(An)
EQW.
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The following example shows that the restriction Yn ∈ L
1
s(D) in the definition of M
is essential for Proposition 4.2 and cannot be eliminated.
Example 4.4. Let N = 2, D1 = D2 = {P} , An = {aξn + Y : a ∈ R, Y ∈ L
∞,
EPY = 0} , where EPξ
+
n = EPξ
−
n = ∞ , n = 1, 2, ξ1 + ξ2 = 1, and W1 = W2 = 0. Take
Xn = ξn , Yn = 1/2− ξn , n = 1, 2. Then Y1 + Y2 = 0 and Wn +Xn + Yn = 1/2, so that
sup
Xn∈An
Yn∈L0 :
∑
nYn=0
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + Yn) =∞.
On the other hand,
⋂
nDn ∩ R(An) = {P} and EPW = 0. ✷
We now pass on to various definitions of equilibrium. From the financial point of view,
the Pareto-type equilibrium corresponds to the global optimum, while the Arrow-Debreu-
type equilibrium corresponds to the competitive optimum.
Definition 4.5. A Pareto-type equilibrium is a collection (X, Y ) =
(X1, . . . , XN , Y1, . . . , YN) such that
(a) Xn ∈ An ;
(b) Yn ∈ L
1
s(D),
∑
n Yn = 0;
(c) there do not exist (X ′, Y ′) satisfying (a), (b) and such that
∀n, un(Wn +X
′
n + Y
′
n) ≥ un(Wn +Xn + Yn),
∃n : un(Wn +X
′
n + Y
′
n) > un(Wn +Xn + Yn).
It is easy to see from the translation invariance property (un(X +m) = un(X) +m)
that condition (c) is equivalent to:
(c’)
∑
n un(Wn +Xn + Yn) =M .
Definition 4.6. An Arrow-Debreu-type equilibrium is a collection (X, Y,Q), where
Q ∈ P , such that
(a) Xn ∈ An ;
(b) Yn ∈ L
1
s(D),
∑
n Yn = 0, EQYn = 0 (so that automatically Yn ∈ L
1(Q));
(c) for any n,
un(Wn +Xn + Yn) = max
ξ∈An
η∈L1(Q) :EQη=0
un(Wn + ξ + η).
Below the notation Y ′ ∼ Y for N -dimensional random vectors (Y ′1 , . . . , Y
′
N) and
(Y1, . . . , YN) means that there exist a1, . . . , aN ∈ R such that
∑
n an = 0 and
Y ′n = Yn + an . We denote
E(X, Y ) = {Q ∈ P : ∃Y ′ ∼ Y such that (X, Y ′,Q) is an Arrow-Debreu-type equilibrium}.
Theorem 4.7. Assume that M < ∞ (by Proposition 4.2, this is equivalent to:⋂
nDn ∩ R(An) 6= ∅). Let Xn ∈ An , Yn ∈ L
1
s(D),
∑
n Yn = 0. The following condi-
tions are equivalent:
(i) (X, Y ) is a Pareto-type equilibrium;
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(ii) there exist Q ∈ P and Y ′ ∼ Y such that (X, Y ′,Q) is an Arrow-Debreu-type
equilibrium.
If these conditions are satisfied, then
E(X, Y ) = X⋂
nDn∩R(An)
(W ).
If each An is a linear space, then (i), (ii) are equivalent to:
(iii)
⋂
nXDn(Wn +Xn + Yn) ∩R(An) 6= ∅.
Moreover, in this case
E(X, Y ) =
N⋂
n=1
XDn(Wn +Xn + Yn) ∩ R(An).
Proof. Step 1. Let us prove the implication (i)⇒(ii). Take Q ∈ X⋂
nDn∩R(An)
(W )
(this set is nonempty due to [5; Prop. 2.9]). Using Proposition 4.2, we can write
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + Yn) ≤
N∑
n=1
EQ(Wn + Yn) ≤ EQ
N∑
n=1
(Wn + Yn) = EQW = M
(note that the expectation operator understood in the sense of [5; Def. 2.3] has the prop-
erty E(ξ + η) ≥ Eξ + Eη ). Since the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the above
inequality coincide, we get un(Wn + Xn + Yn) = EQ(Wn + Yn) for any n. We can find
Y ′ ∼ Y such that EQY
′
n = 0 for any n. Then, for any n, ξ ∈ An , and η ∈ L
1(Q) such
that EQη = 0, we have
un(Wn + ξ + η) ≤ EQ(Wn + ξ + η) ≤ EQWn = un(Wn +Xn + Y
′
n).
Thus, (X, Y ′,Q) is an Arrow-Debreu-type equilibrium.
Step 2. Let us prove the implication (ii)⇒(i). Suppose that there exist X˜n ∈ An and
Y˜n ∈ L
1
s(Dn) with
∑
n Y˜n = 0 such that
N∑
n=1
un(Wn + X˜n + Y˜n) >
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + Yn). (4.2)
Fix n and suppose that Q /∈ Dn ∩R(An). By the Hahn-Banach theorem, there exists
η ∈ L∞ such that EQη < infQ∈Dn∩R(An) EQη . According to Proposition 2.6, there exists
ξ ∈ An such that EQη < un(ξ + η). This means that un(ξ + η − EQη) > 0. Then
un(Wn + αξ + α(η − EQη)) −−−→
α→∞
∞. (4.3)
In view of Proposition 4.2, the condition M < ∞ implies that Dn ∩ R(An) 6= ∅ . Then,
for any Q˜ ∈ Dn ∩ R(An), we have
un(Wn +Xn + Yn) ≤ EQ˜(Wn + Yn) <∞,
which contradicts (4.3).
Thus, Q ∈
⋂
nDn ∩ R(An). In particular, Yn ∈ L
1(Q), so that we can find Y˜ ′ ∼ Y˜
such that EQY˜
′
n = 0 for any n. Then
N∑
n=1
un(Wn + X˜n + Y˜n) =
N∑
n=1
un(Wn + X˜n + Y˜
′
n) ≤
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + Yn),
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which contradicts (4.2).
Step 3. It was shown in Step 1 that
X⋂
nDn∩R(An)
(W ) ⊆ E(X, Y ).
Let us prove the reverse inclusion. Take Q ∈ E(X, Y ) and find Y ′ ∼ Y such
that (X, Y ′,Q) is an Arrow-Debreu-type equilibrium. It was shown in Step 2 that
Q ∈
⋂
nDn ∩ R(An). Applying Proposition 2.6 to the Dn -consistent convex cone
A = {η ∈ L∞ : EQη = 0} , we get
sup
η∈L1(Q):EQη=0
un(Wn + η) = EQWn, n = 1, . . . , N. (4.4)
Thus,
M ≥
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + Yn) =
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + Y
′
n) ≥
N∑
n=1
EQWn = EQW.
An application of Theorem 4.3 completes the proof.
Step 4. Assume that each An is linear and let us prove the inclusion
N⋂
n=1
XDn(Wn +Xn + Yn) ∩ R(An) ⊆ E(X, Y ).
Take Q from the left-hand side of this inclusion. Find Y ′ ∼ Y such that EQY
′
n = 0 for
any n. Clearly, Q ∈
⋂
nXDn(Wn +Xn + Y
′
n) ∩ R(An), so that
un(Wn +Xn + Y
′
n) = EQ(Wn +Xn + Y
′
n) = EQ(Wn +Xn), n = 1, . . . , N.
As XDn(Wn+Xn+Y
′
n) 6= ∅ , we have (by the definition of X ) that un(Wn+Xn+Y
′
n) > −∞ .
Furthermore, (by the definition of R) EQXn ≤ 0, so that Xn ∈ L
1(Q). For any n, ξ ∈ An ,
and η ∈ L1(Q) such that EQη = 0, we have
un(Wn + ξ + η) ≤ EQ(Wn + ξ + η) = EQ(Wn + ξ)
= EQ(Wn +Xn + (ξ −Xn)) ≤ EQ(Wn +Xn) = un(Wn +Xn + Y
′
n)
(in the second inequality, we used the linearity of An ), so that (X, Y
′,Q) is an Arrow-
Debreu-type equilibrium.
Step 5. Assume that each An is linear and let us prove the inclusion
E(X, Y ) ⊆
N⋂
n=1
XDn(Wn +Xn + Yn) ∩ R(An).
Take Q ∈ E(X, Y ) and find Y ′ ∼ Y such that (X, Y ′,Q) is an Arrow-Debreu-type
equilibrium. It was shown in Step 2 that Q ∈
⋂
nDn ∩ R(An). Applying (4.4) and
Proposition 2.6, we get
EQWn = sup
η∈L1(Q) :EQη=0
un(Wn + η) ≤ un(Wn +Xn + Y
′
n)
≤ EQ(Wn +Xn + Y
′
n) ≤ EQWn, n = 1, . . . , N.
Consequently, un(Wn + Xn + Y
′
n) = EQ(Wn + Xn + Y
′
n) for any n, which means that
Q ∈
⋂
nXDn(Wn +Xn + Y
′
n) =
⋂
nXDn(Wn +Xn + Yn). ✷
The assumption that each An is linear is essential for the second part of Theorem 4.7
as shown by the following example.
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Example 4.8. Let N = 2, D1 = D2 = {P} , A1 = A2 = R− (i.e. A1 , A2 consist of
random variables that are identically equal to a negative constant), and W1 = W2 = 0.
Take X1 = X2 = −1, Y1 = Y2 = 0. Then
⋂
nXDn(Xn + Yn) ∩ R(An) = {P} , but clearly
(X, Y ) is not a Pareto-type equilibrium. ✷
By Theorem 4.7, the set E(X, Y ) does not depend on (X, Y ). We call it the
set of equilibrium measures and denote by E (Theorem 4.7 yields the representation
E = X⋂
nDn∩R(An)
(W )).
From the financial point of view, E is the set of equilibrium price systems. Thus, it
is natural to define the set of unconstrained equilibrium prices of a contingent claim F
simply as IE(F ) := {EQF : Q ∈ E} .
4.2 Constrained Equilibrium
Let un , Dn , An , and Wn be the same as in the previous subsection. Let S be a d-
dimensional random vector whose components belong to
⋂
n L
1
s(Dn). From the financial
point of view, there are d financial contracts that can be exchanged between the agents,
and Si means the payoff of the i-th contract. (There is no relation between S and An ;
An means the set of P&Ls that can be obtained by the n-th agent without trading the
assets 1, . . . , d .)
Definition 4.9. The maximal overall utility is defined as
M = sup
Xn∈An
hn∈Rd :
∑
nhn=0
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉),
where the sum is understood as −∞ if any of the summands equals −∞ .
Let us introduce the notation
Gn = cl{EQS : Q ∈ Dn ∩ R(An)},
G˜n = cl{EQ(S,Wn) : Q ∈ Dn ∩R(An)},
fn(x) = inf{y : (x, y) ∈ G˜n}, x ∈ Gn,
G =
N⋂
n=1
Gn,
f(x) =
N∑
n=1
fn(x), x ∈ G.
Proposition 4.10. We have
M = inf
x∈G
f(x),
where inf ∅ :=∞.
Proof. By Proposition 2.6, we have for any hn ∈ R
d ,
sup
Xn∈An
un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉) = inf
Q∈Dn∩R(An)
EQ(Wn + 〈hn, S〉)
= inf
x∈G˜n
〈(hn, 1), x〉
= inf
x∈Gn
(〈hn, x〉+ fn(x)).
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Standard results of convex analysis (see [18; Th. 16.4]) yield
M = sup
hn∈Rd :
∑
nhn=0
N∑
n=1
inf
x∈Gn
(〈hn, x〉+ fn(x)) = inf
x∈G
f(x).
We now pass on to various definitions of equilibrium.
Definition 4.11. A Pareto-type equilibrium is a collection (X, h) =
(X1, . . . , XN , h1, . . . , hN) such that
(a) Xn ∈ An ;
(b) hn ∈ R
d ,
∑
n hn = 0;
(c) there do not exist (X ′, h′) satisfying (a), (b) and such that
∀n, un(Wn +X
′
n + 〈h
′
n, S〉) ≥ un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉),
∃n : un(Wn +X
′
n + 〈h
′
n, S〉) > un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉).
It is easy to see from the translation invariance property (un(X +m) = un(X) +m)
that condition (c) is equivalent to:
(c’)
∑
n un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉) = M .
Definition 4.12. An Arrow-Debreu-type equilibrium is a collection (X, h, P ), where
P ∈ Rd , such that
(a) Xn ∈ An ;
(b) hn ∈ R
d ,
∑
n hn = 0;
(c) for any n,
un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S − P 〉) = max
ξ∈An, η∈Rd
un(Wn + ξ + 〈η, S − P 〉).
Let us introduce the notation
E(X, h) = {P ∈ Rd : (X, h, P ) is an Arrow-Debreu-type equilibrium}.
Theorem 4.13. Assume that M < ∞ (by Proposition 4.10, this is equivalent to:
G 6= ∅). Let Xn ∈ An , hn ∈ R
d ,
∑
n hn = 0. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) (X, h) is a Pareto-type equilibrium;
(ii) there exists P ∈ Rd such that (X, h, P ) is an Arrow-Debreu-type equilibrium.
If these conditions are satisfied, then
E(X, h) = argmin
x∈G
f(x).
If each An is a linear space, then (i), (ii) are equivalent to:
(iii)
⋂
n{EQS : Q ∈ XDn(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉) ∩R(An)} 6= ∅.
Moreover, in this case
E(X, h) =
N⋂
n=1
{EQS : Q ∈ XDn(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉) ∩R(An)}.
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Proof. Step 1. Let us prove the implication (i)⇒(ii). Take P ∈ argminx∈G f(x).
Using Proposition 4.10, we can write
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉) ≤
N∑
n=1
inf
x∈G˜n
〈(hn, 1), x〉
≤
N∑
n=1
(fn(P ) + 〈hn, P 〉) = f(P ) = M.
As the left-hand side and the right-hand side of this inequality coincide, we get
un(Wn + Xn + 〈hn, S〉) = fn(P ) + 〈hn, P 〉 for any n. Thus, for any n, ξ ∈ An , and
η ∈ Rd , we have
un(Wn + ξ + 〈η, S − P 〉) = un(Wn + ξ + 〈η, S〉)− 〈η, P 〉
≤ fn(P ) + 〈η, P 〉 − 〈η, P 〉
= un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S − P 〉).
Thus, (X, h, P ) is an Arrow-Debreu-type equilibrium.
Step 2. The implication (ii)⇒(i) follows from the inequality: for any X˜n ∈ An and
h˜n ∈ R
d with
∑
n h˜n = 0, we have
N∑
n=1
un(Wn + X˜n + 〈h˜n, S〉) =
N∑
n=1
un(Wn + X˜n + 〈h˜n, S − P 〉)
≤
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S − P 〉)
=
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉).
Step 3. It was shown in Step 1 that
argmin
x∈G
f(x) ⊆ E(X, h).
Let us prove the reverse inclusion. Take P ∈ E(X, h). Fix n and suppose that P /∈ Gn .
Then there exists η ∈ Rd such that 〈η, P 〉 < infx∈Gn〈η, x〉 . According to Proposition 2.6,
there exists ξ ∈ An such that 〈η, P 〉 < un(ξ + 〈η, S〉). Then
un(Wn + αξ + 〈αη, S − P 〉) −−−→
α→∞
∞. (4.5)
In view of Proposition 4.10, the condition M <∞ implies that Dn ∩ R(An) 6= ∅ . Then,
for any Q ∈ Dn ∩ R(An), we have
un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S − P 〉) ≤ EQ(Wn + 〈hn, S − P 〉),
which contradicts (4.5).
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Thus, P ∈ G. Using Proposition 2.6, we can write
M ≥
N∑
n=1
un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S − P 〉)
=
N∑
n=1
sup
ξ∈An,η∈Rd
un(Wn + ξ + 〈η, S − P 〉)
=
N∑
n=1
sup
η∈Rd
inf
x∈Gn
(fn(x) + 〈η, x− P 〉)
=
N∑
n=1
fn(P ) = f(P ).
An application of Proposition 4.10 completes the proof.
Step 4. Assume that each An is linear and let us prove the inclusion
N⋂
n=1
{EQS : Q ∈ XDn(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉) ∩ R(An)} ⊆ E(X, h).
Take P from the left-hand side of this inclusion. Using the same arguments as in the proof
of [5; Prop. 2.9], we can find for every n a measure Qn ∈ XDn(Wn+Xn+ 〈hn, S〉)∩R(An)
such that P = EQnS (using the Dn -consistency of An , it is easy to check that
XDn(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉) ∩R(An) is L
1 -closed, so this set is weakly compact). Then
un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S − P 〉) = EQn(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉)− 〈h, P 〉
= EQn(Wn +Xn), n = 1, . . . , N.
As XDn(Wn + Xn + 〈hn, S〉) 6= ∅ , we have (by the definition of X ) that
un(Wn + Xn + 〈hn, S〉) > −∞ . Furthermore, (by the definition of R) EQnXn ≤ 0,
so that Xn ∈ L
1(Qn). For any n, ξ ∈ An , and η ∈ R
d , we have
un(Wn + ξ + 〈η, S − P 〉) ≤ EQn(Wn + ξ + 〈η, S − P 〉) = EQn(Wn + ξ)
= EQn(Wn +Xn + (ξ −Xn)) ≤ EQn(Wn +Xn)
= un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S − P 〉)
(in the second inequality, we used the linearity of An ), so that (X, h, P ) is an Arrow-
Debreu-type equilibrium.
Step 5. Assume that each An is linear and let us prove the inclusion
E(X, h) ⊆
N⋂
n=1
{EQS : Q ∈ XDn(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉) ∩ R(An)}.
Take P ∈ E(X, h). It was shown in Step 3 that P ∈ G. Using the same arguments as
in the proof of [5; Prop. 2.9], we can find for every n a measure Qn ∈ Dn ∩ R(An) such
that EQnS = P and EQnWn = fn(P ). Applying Proposition 2.6, we get
fn(P ) = sup
η∈Rd
inf
x∈Gn
(fn(x) + 〈η, x− P 〉)
= sup
ξ∈An, η∈Rd
un(Wn + ξ + 〈η, S − P 〉)
= un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S − P 〉)
≤ EQn(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S − P 〉)
≤ EQnWn = fn(P ).
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Consequently, un(Wn+Xn+ 〈hn, S−P 〉) = EQn(Wn+Xn+ 〈hn, S−P 〉) for any n, which
means that Qn ∈ XDn(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉). ✷
Let G◦n denote the relative interior of Gn , and, for P ∈ Gn , we denote
NG˜n(P ) =
{
η ∈ Rd : 〈(η, 1), (P, fn(P ))〉 = inf
x∈G˜n
〈(η, 1), x〉
}
.
If G˜n has a nonempty interior, then NG˜n(P ) is the set of vectors η ∈ R
d such that (η, 1)
is an inner normal to G˜n at the point (P, fn(P )).
✲
✻
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Figure 11. Geometric solution of the constrained equilibrium
problem. Here S = F is a one-dimensional contingent claim.
The figure shows the maximal overall utility M , the equilibrium
holdings hn , and the equilibrium price IE(F ). It also shows the
NBC prices INBC(Dn,An,Wn)(F ) of different agents.
Theorem 4.14. Assume that
⋂
nG
◦
n 6= ∅. Take P ∈ argminx∈G f(x). Then there
exist hn ∈ NG˜n(P ) such that
∑
n hn = 0. Assume that, for each n, there exists
Xn ∈ argmaxξ∈An un(Wn + ξ + 〈hn, S〉). Then (X1, . . . , XN , h1, . . . , hN , P ) is an Arrow-
Debreu-type equilibrium. Conversely, any Arrow-Debreu-type equilibrium has such a form.
Proof. Denote f ∗n(η) = infx∈Gn(fn(x) + 〈η, x〉), η ∈ R
d . Standard results of con-
vex analysis (see [18; Th. 16.4]) guarantee that there exist h1, . . . , hN ∈ R
d such that∑
n hn = 0 and
∑
n f
∗
n(hn) = f(P ). It follows from the line
f(P ) =
N∑
n=1
f ∗n(hn) ≤
N∑
n=1
(fn(P ) + 〈h, P 〉) = f(P )
that hn ∈ NG˜n(P ) for any n. By Proposition 2.6,
un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S〉) = sup
ξ∈An
un(Wn + ξ + 〈hn, S〉)
= inf
x∈G˜n
〈(hn, 1), x〉
= f ∗n(hn) = fn(P ) + 〈hn, P 〉, n = 1, . . . , N.
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Consequently, for any n, ξ ∈ An , and η ∈ R
d ,
un(Wn + ξ + 〈η, S − P 〉) ≤ inf
x∈G˜n
〈(η, 1), x〉 − 〈η, P 〉
= f ∗n(η)− 〈η, P 〉 ≤ fn(P )
= un(Wn +Xn + 〈hn, S − P 〉),
so that (X, h, P ) is an Arrow-Debreu-type equilibrium.
Conversely, let (X, h, P ) be an Arrow-Debreu-type equilibrium. According to Propo-
sition 4.10, P ∈ argminx∈G f(x). Using the same arguments as in Step 1 of the
proof of Theorem 4.13, we deduce that hn ∈ NG˜n(P ) for any n. The inclusion
Xn ∈ argmaxξ∈An un(Wn + ξ + 〈hn, S〉) is clear from the definition of the Arrow-Debreu-
type equilibrium. ✷
By Theorem 4.13, the set E(X, Y ) does not depend on (X, Y ). We call it the
set of equilibrium prices and denote by E (Theorem 4.13 yields the representation
E = argminx∈G f(x)).
From the financial point of view, E is the set of equilibrium price vectors for the
multidimensional contract S . If S = F is a one-dimensional contingent claim, we call E
the set of constrained equilibrium prices of F and denote it by IE(F ).
5 Conclusion
In [5] and in the present paper, we proposed seven different pricing techniques. They
differ by the inputs they require and by the ideas behind them. These techniques are
compared by Figure 12 and by Table 1.
Utility-based NGD interval
RAROC-based NGD interval
Multi-agent NBC interval
Agent-independent NBC price
Single-agent NBC prices
Unconstrained
equilibrium
price
Constrained
equilibrium
price
Figure 12. The form of fair prices provided by various techniques
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Pricing
technique
Inputs Form of the price interval
Utility-based
No Good Deals
D, A {EQF : Q ∈ D ∩R}
RAROC-based
No Good Deals
PD, RD,
A, R
{
EQF : Q ∈
(
1
1+R
PD + R
1+R
RD
)
∩ R
}
Agent-independent
No Better Choice
PD, RD, A
{
EQF : Q ∈
(
1
1+R∗
PD + R∗
1+R∗
RD
)
∩ R
}
,
where R∗ = supX∈ARAROC(X){
EQF : Q∈
(
1
1+R∗
XPD(X∗)+
R∗
1+R∗
XRD(X∗)
)
∩R
}
,
where X∗ ∈ argmaxX∈ARAROC(X)
Single-agent
No Better Choice
D, A, W {EQF : Q ∈ XD(W ) ∩R}
{EQF : Q ∈ XD(W )} provided that this is a single-
ton and u(W ) = maxX∈A u(W +X)
Multi-agent
No Better Choice
D1, . . . ,DN ,
A,
W1, . . . ,WN
{
EQF : Q ∈ conv
N
n=1(XDn(Wn) ∩ R)
}
Unconstrained
equilibrium
D1, . . . ,DN ,
A1, . . . , AN ,
W1, . . . ,WN
{EQF : Q ∈ E}, where E = X⋂nDn∩R(An)(∑nWn)
Constrained
equilibrium
D1, . . . ,DN ,
A1, . . . , AN ,
W1, . . . ,WN
argminx
∑
n fn(x), where
fn(x) = inf{EQWn : Q ∈ Dn ∩ R(An), EQF = x}
Table 1. The form of fair prices provided by various techniques
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